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Concerted action by political, social and private actors at the local
level can be very useful for promoting economic competitiveness, but in
order for it to become a reality it would be essential for the local
communities to have greater autonomy and resources, as well as equal
opportunities. This article begins by investigating the conditions required
in order to ensure that the deeper political decentralization needed for
local development will promote efficiency and equity, as well as the ways
in which transfer systems can become decisive means for increasing
equity and generating greater efficiency. Within this theoretical
framework, an analysis is then made of the basic transfer systems used
in the older and/or more advanced decentralization processes of the
region, and some guidelines are proposed not only for making local
development viable in the conditions in question but also for progressing
in building fuller citizenship.
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Political decentralization in Latin America forms part
of the democratization processes begun in the 1980s,
which took as their starting point the historical
territorial organization of each country. The main aim
of decentralization —with differing types of emphasis
in each country— was to generate new spaces for
citizen participation, tackle problems of fiscal
imbalance, and organize the State apparatus at the local
or territorial level in order to implement social policies
that would make it possible to address the problem of
the social debt. In the countries where this territorial
reform was started earliest, this was of decisive
importance for broadening or focusing those policies,
although it was only possible to channel citizen
participation in a constructive manner in the cases where
suitable social capital already existed. Decentralization
has often failed to give positive results, however, in
terms of aiding fiscal balance, and this has undoubtedly
hindered the progress of these processes.
Political decentralization is taking on renewed
importance today, not only for promoting fuller
citizenship and social inclusion, but also in terms of
economic development. Thus, it is now generally
agreed that competitiveness depends not only on the
firms themselves, the macroeconomic balances and
active national policies, but also on the capacity of each
locality to tackle its own development through
processes of concerted public-social-private decisions
and action. In order for this to take place, it is essential
that local areas should have greater autonomy.
An essential aspect of decentralization is that of
the transfers needed to make up for the different
income-generating capabilities of the different political
and administrative divisions. In Latin America, such
transfers are the main source of income for most of the
subnational levels of government —especially the
municipalities— and in some countries they account
for a substantial proportion of public expenditure.
In terms of equity, the transfer systems which
have accompanied the decentralization processes in
Latin America have involved, in all cases, substantial
initial progressive territorial redistribution, although
this has often subsequently proved to be insufficient
to offset the inequalities generated by the
decentralization process itself.
It would have been desirable for the transfer
systems to have been designed in such a way as to
make the objective of equity compatible with stability,
but in most cases, as the territorial transfers involve fixed
shares of national taxes, they prove to be procyclical
(Ocampo, 2001), and when, in addition, they encourage
expenditure that does not depend on the corresponding
tax efforts, they help to generate pressures that give rise
to imbalances (Finot, 1996 and 2001).
In order to counteract these pressures, there is a
tendency to adopt controls on spending and limits on
subnational indebtedness. Examples of this are the
Fiscal Responsibility Act in Brazil (Federal Republic
of Brazil, 2000) and, in the case of Colombia, the
Indebtedness Control Act (Colombia, 1997), the
Territorial Expenditure Rationalization Act (Colombia,
2000a) and the Fiscal Responsibility Act (Colombia,
2003). While these measures aid fiscal balance, they
may restrict the autonomy of local bodies. Yet, as
already noted, making local economic development
viable calls for more, not less, local autonomy.
Furthermore, it is necessary to continue progressing in
terms of social equity and citizenship-building, while
maintaining efficiency and stability. How can the
objective of strengthening local autonomy be reconciled
with those of equity, efficiency and stability?
In order to answer this question, section II of this
article analyses the conditions needed to attain deeper
political decentralization while at the same time
promoting efficiency and equity; with this aim, a
summary updated version of the conceptual framework
that has been developed since earlier studies is
presented. In section III, an analysis is made of the
main autonomy-related financial aspects of the older
and/or more advanced decentralization processes in the
   This article is a corrected version of the paper presented by the
author at the Fourteenth Regional Seminar on Fiscal Policy, held at
ECLAC headquarters in Santiago, Chile, from 26 to 29 January 2004.
The author wishes to express his thanks to all the participants in
that Seminar who submitted opinions and suggestions on the
previous version, to the judges that it was submitted to and to the
moderators of that meeting, to Alberto Maldonado, of the
Universidad de los Andes, for his valuable observations regarding
Colombia, and to Cristina Aziz for the information she supplied on
Brazil.
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region: those of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, among
the federal countries, and those of Bolivia, Chile and
Colombia in the case of the unitary countries.1 Finally,
section IV presents some conclusions and guidelines
that may be useful for the countries of the region in
pursuing the objectives in question.
1
 In order to have comparable data, the quantitative analysis is based
on figures from the International Monetary Fund.
2
 Oates himself (1999) admits, on looking back, that it was probably
unfortunate to call the theory he founded “fiscal federalism”, because
this would tend to restrict it to the narrow fiscal field, whereas the
subject of that theory was rather the entire vertical structure of the
public sector. Moreover, according to Afonso (2003), since “fiscal
federalism” is based on a methodology of individualism, it would
not be suitable for studying federalism proper, which by definition
is an agreement among communities, not individuals.
II
Conditions for efficiency and equity
The economic aspects of decentralization are
undoubtedly essential in these processes, but it would
appear that in the Latin American region we have not
yet taken sufficient account of that branch of the
economy whose field is the provision of public goods
at the different territorial levels, nor are we developing
it sufficiently to allow us to progress in line with our
needs.
This may have occurred partly because the
founder of that branch, Wallace Oates, called it “fiscal
federalism” (Oates, 1972), which may have given the
impression that it referred only to federal countries.2
The theory based on that branch is perfectly suitable,
however, for analysing the economic aspects of
decentralization, especially when this is aimed at the
levels closest to citizens themselves, since reducing the
ambit of demands could facilitate the processes of
determining collective preferences.
This section thus begins by analysing the
conditions whereby political decentralization aids
efficiency and then going on to deduce the requisites
for ensuring that transfer systems aid both efficiency
and equity.
1. Decentralization
Decentralization refers to the provision of public goods,
in which two types of decisions may be distinguished:
i) what part of income is to be used to provide those
goods, who should provide them, and what amount
should be provided, and ii) how are the publicly
provided goods going to be produced. Generally
speaking, in Latin America both types of decisions
have been decentralized to the subnational levels of
government, but some decisions of the second type
have also been decentralized to the market.3 The
necessary conditions for efficiency can be analysed for
both forms of decentralization, but in view of the
objectives of the present article, these conditions will
be analysed here only for the case of the decentralization
to subnational levels of government of the responsibility
for providing public goods.
Generally speaking, the concept of decentralization
to lower levels of government has been associated with
the idea of greater political autonomy (see Palma and
Rufián, 1989, for example). All the processes,
however, involve the assignment of functions to
subnational governments not only in their capacity as
the heads of autonomous units but also as agents of the
national government: they execute different
combinations of decisions adopted at the local level and
other decisions taken at the central level. In the first
case, this is political decentralization, and in the second
it is operational decentralization,4 each of which has
different requisites for efficiency, so that it is important
to be able to distinguish which tasks each level of
government carries out as the head of an autonomous
unit, and which it carries out as an agent of the central
government.
We will now analyse what those requisites are,
with the main emphasis on political decentralization,
which is more closely linked with autonomy.
3
 In the sense assigned by Bennett (1990): a process which we have
called “economic decentralization” (Finot, 1996).
4
 I prefer to use the term “operational decentralization” rather than
“delegation” (as some authors call this situation) because, as Palma
and Rufián (1989) explain so well, delegation can be suspended by
the principal at any moment. The concept of decentralization, in
contrast, implies a definitive transfer of authority and freedom to
take decisions (in this case, administrative decisions).
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a) Political decentralization
Political decentralization may be understood as
the transfer of democratic decision-making processes
on expenditure and financing for the provision of given
public goods from one political/administrative level to
another lower level.
There are three main conditions for ensuring that
this transfer contributes to greater efficiency: i) that the
ambits of the local decision-making processes
correspond to geographical differences in demand; ii)
that citizen preferences are effectively revealed; and iii)
that the gains generated by the foregoing conditions are
greater than the possible losses in terms of economies
of scale.
i) Adaptation to differences in demand. Oates
(1972) noted that the main problem in decentralization
is to decide to what level each type of provision best
corresponds.5 The fundamental problem would be that,
generally speaking, political/administrative maps do
not coincide with geographically differentiated
demands. Indeed, there is no reason why they should:
the former have been configured as a function of
political/administrative control of the territory, while
the latter are the result of such factors as the location
of natural resources, access facilities, and investments
in infrastructure. Trying to modify the former could
give rise to conflicts between local areas, whereas the
latter undergo constant modification without any limits
other than the respective local regulations (including
those on international relations).
What can we do about the lack of adaptation
between decision-making processes encompassed by
the political/administrative maps and those subject to the
corresponding geographical/economic maps? In
principle, the solution could be to deepen
decentralization down to the levels closest to the citizens
and promote association among local governments in
respect of shared differentiated demands through
transfers.6
ii) Effective revelation of preferences. In the
provision of local public goods, each community
should be able to reveal its preferences, in full
knowledge of the cost of the alternatives, and should
be able to opt for a mix of goods in the light of what
it will cost them.7
In order to stimulate the economic mechanisms of
efficiency, then, the communities to which authority
is decentralized should have the power not only to
define expenditure but also to determine the level of
the taxes whereby they will help to finance that
expenditure. In order to avoid the multiplication of
taxes, the tax bases should be established nationally but
the subnational communities at which political
decentralization is aimed should have the faculty to
modify the respective tax rates (within a certain range).
The most desirable situation would be for these
decisions to refer to direct taxes (in principle, on
immovable property), since modifying indirect tax rates
would directly affect the system of prices (as well as
requiring the keeping of accounts on inter-territorial
imports and exports).8 This would also be desirable in
the case of taxes with shared bases, where the
subnational levels of government should have the
power to fix their own rates.
On the other hand, for reasons of equity it would
not be a good idea for the royalties received for the
exploitation of non-renewable natural resources to be
shared with the subnational levels (Musgrave and
Musgrave, 1989), or at any rate not in substantial
percentages. Moreover, strictly speaking these sources
of income cannot be considered as taxes.
An assumption which is not explicitly stated in
Oates’s work is that the local mechanisms for the
revelation of preferences must be at least as efficient
as those at the central level. If decentralization tended
to strengthen undemocratic —or still worse, corrupt—
assignment processes, it could turn out to be less
efficient than assignment through centralized processes.
5
 Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961) had already noted that, for a
metropolis, a “polycentric” system in which the provision of public
goods whose demand is geographically differentiated corresponds
to locally elected governments, while only the provision of goods
with uniform demand is left in the hands of the central metropolitan
government, would be a more efficient solution than a system in
which the provision of all services is centralized. This finding was
subsequently formalized by Oates (1972) in his “decentralization
theorem”.
6
 Furthermore, to the extent that this adaptation of territorial
organization to differentiated demands was achieved, this would
reduce externalities, which are another typical aspect involved in
decentralization.
7
 This process can be clearly seen, for example, in the decisions
taken by innumerable social organizations of the region, which very
often make an important contribution to the provision of public
goods and externalities. As we have been proposing since 1990
(Finot, 1990), these contributions should be considered as “quasi
taxes”.
8
 It is generally agreed that the best local taxes would be those
based on property and also, increasingly, that the way to increase
subnational income might be to share in income taxes, as Bird (2001)
notes. As the same author warns, however —quoting Shome
(2000)— few Latin American countries have really solid income
tax systems.
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The electoral system based on proportional
representation —which prevails in the region at the
municipal level—9 would not be the most suitable for
expressing citizen preferences at the local level, since
it means that representatives are answerable to the
politicians who included them in their lists, rather than
to the population represented, and in the final analysis
it is those representatives who, when approving the
relevant budget, decide what goods are to be provided
publicly, in what amount, and with what local
contributions.
Even if the electoral system is changed from
proportional representation to a system based on
territorial representation,10 however, it is obvious that
both politicians and administrative officials have their
own interests, so that it is important to offset these
through other forms of citizen participation. Direct
political participation (referenda, citizen consultations,
revocation of authority) and social participation, through
social organizations, are forms which should be
facilitated in this respect in order to generate and clarify
easily understood information —both basic information
and information on management performance.11
It is not enough, then, for democratic decision-
making processes on allocation merely to correspond
as accurately as possible to differences in demand: in
order for political decentralization to promote more
efficient allocation it is essential that decisions on local
expenditure should be linked with local contributions
and that there should be suitable systems of citizen
representation and participation so that the citizens’
preferences may be effectively revealed.
iii) Economies of scale. The weighting given to
this factor may have gone down more recently: the
flexibility of present-day production processes may
help decentralized solutions to be more efficient, but for
this to be so there must be access to new technologies,
and above all, availability of suitably skilled staff. At
all events, the ambit to which the provision of each
decentralizable public good should be transferred
should always correspond to a level where the benefits
of decentralization outweigh its costs, including among
the latter the costs deriving from an increase in the
number of administrations involved.
b) Operational decentralization.
Operational decentralization occurs in cases of
the provision of public goods where decentralization
does not include the decision-making power over
what goods are to be provided, in what amount, and
with what contributions from citizens, but only
matters connected with the implementation of
decisions adopted in that respect by a central
government. According to Heymann (1988), the
benefits of this form of decentralization mainly derive
from the better information possessed by the local
levels of government, while the costs stem from the
risk that the agents may take advantage of the
situation to the detriment of the interests of the
principal.
In this case too it would be desirable to assess
whether the benefits of having the local governments
as agents are higher than the costs of enlisting them
for this purpose. Just as, in the case of political
decentralization, the basic criterion of efficiency would
be to achieve the greatest possible correspondence
between effectively expressed geographically
differentiated demands and the existing political and
administrative divisions, so in the case of operational
decentralization the criterion would be to achieve the
best possible combination between the benefits of
taking advantage of the capabilities of the local
governments (either individually or in association) and
the costs generated by losses of economies of scale and
the installation of control mechanisms.
Within each sectoral policy, an evaluation should
be made of what should be decentralized politically and
what should only be decentralized operationally. In
school education, for example, it would be appropriate
to politically decentralize the definition of part of the
compulsory minimum curricula, but income
redistribution policies designed to give equal
opportunities to all the inhabitants of the country,
whatever their place of residence, should only be
decentralized operationally.
9
 An exception is Panama, where the Municipal Councils are made
up of representatives of the “corregimientos” or districts which make
up each municipality.
10
 Using a system providing for the election of single representatives
or, what would be preferable (as I have been proposing since 1990,
on the basis of Duverger, 1970), a system providing for one
representative per district defined in line with the existing historical
and geographical situation, plus an additional number of
representatives depending on the population of each district.
11
 Porto Alegre’s experience with regard to participative budgets
shows the advantages of social participation for revealing preferences
better and increasing citizen input. Harnecker (2003), who followed
up the process from the beginning, notes the “consternation” initially
caused among those taking part in “participative budgeting” when
they realized that, in order to achieve what they were proposing,
they would have to pay taxes. It can now be seen that participative
budgeting has not only led to more efficient resource allocation but
also to an ongoing increase in revenue collection (Prefeitura
Municipal de Porto Alegre, 2003).
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c) Responsibility (accountability)
Just as, in political decentralization, information
systems on the actions of the authorities should be
aimed primarily at the local communities, in the case
of operational decentralization the local levels of
government should be primarily accountable to their
principal: the respective central government
(Silverman, 1992). Apart from the difficulties inherent
in the agent-principal relationship, however, the
practical problem in this case is that the accounts of
the local administrations do not usually make any clear
differentiation between tasks carried out on the basis
of local decisions and those carried out in line with
central government decisions, or regarding the origin
of the resources with which those tasks are executed,
so that it is not possible to distinguish clearly to what
authority the local governments are primarily
accountable in each case.
In short, in both situations it would be essential
to have suitable management information systems: in
the case of political decentralization, in order to render
accounts primarily to the community, and in the case
of operational decentralization, in order to render
accounts to the central government. It would be highly
desirable for citizens to be properly informed in both
these cases, but in order for there to be effective
responsibilities, this difference between principals
should be clearly laid down in the accounts themselves.
2. Transfers: how to reconcile efficiency with
equity
Generally speaking, the specialized literature
distinguishes two basic types of territorial transfers:
unconditional and conditional transfers. If it is accepted
that one of the requisites for efficiency is that decisions
on expenditure should be linked to those regarding the
respective contributions to be made by the citizens,
however, the first question to be asked about territorial
transfers is whether or not they are designed to support
local expenditure decisions linked with local
contributions of resources.12 Completely unconditional
transfers would not help to ensure fulfillment of this
condition for efficiency and would give rise instead
simply to a political decentralization only of the
expenditure. Furthermore, expenditures which do not
involve citizen contributions would disincentivate
citizen participation (which is already made more
difficult by the prevailing electoral systems) and would
facilitate the use of resources for private purposes.
The situation would be different in the case of
transfers which, while not conditional upon local
contributions, are conditioned in respect of the use to
be made of them, since if such conditions were
imposed, this would make it possible to introduce
controls like those of operational decentralization.
Finally, if transfers were conditional upon both the use
to be made of them and the provision of local
contributions (for example, co-financing funds), the
operational decentralization elements would exceed
those of political decentralization.
Table 1 gives a summary of this analysis. Only
transfers which are freely disposable but are
proportional to local contributions (those of type 1)
would help to generate conditions of efficiency in
political decentralization.
If transfers are to depend on local contributions,
however, how will it be possible to attain the primary
objective of those transfers, which is to make up for
differences between local areas? The theoretical
solution —already proposed some years ago (Finot,
1996; ECLAC/ILPES, 1998)—would be for territorial
transfers to be proportional to the respective local
contributions, measured not in absolute terms,
however, but as a proportion of the levels of income
of the inhabitants of each community.13 The principle
12
 In line with the pioneering proposal by Wiesner (1992 and 2002).
TABLE 1
Conditions for transfers and types of
decentralization




No Political decentralization Political
Conditional of expenditure decentralization
on use to be
made of 3 4




Source: Prepared by the author.
13
 A more equitable alternative to the present situation would
undoubtedly be for the municipal expenditure per inhabitant to be
brought up to a standard level through transfers, as proposed for
Brazil by Prado, Cuadros and Cavalcanti (2003): this involves an
important difference from the proposal made in this article, because
in that case the transfers would not be linked to local efforts.
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of taxing individuals in proportion to their respective
capacities, that is to say, in proportion to the incomes
they enjoy, which was proposed by Adam Smith (and
cited by Musgrave, 1959), should also be applied to
local communities.
This transfer system should coincide with the
expansion of the taxation powers of the subnational
levels, in order for the various local communities to
be able to determine, by democratic processes, the level
of the taxes whereby they will help to finance the
expenditure they decide upon.14 This would reconcile
the objectives of equity with those of efficiency and
stimulation of citizen participation.
3. Territorial redistribution and social
redistribution
A system in which territorial transfers were freely
disposable but proportional to the relative local
contributions would make it possible to deepen
political decentralization under conditions of both
efficiency (including fiscal efficiency) and territorial
equity, but it would not ensure social equity. Achieving
this latter objective is the primary raison d’être of
conditioned transfers. This has led countries such as
Mexico to make a clear differentiation between freely
disposable transfers and transfers designed exclusively
for such purposes as health and education services.
Generally speaking, the decentralization processes
in Latin America are marked by the expansion of
powers for the local provision of basic infrastructure
services and —in particular— by the transfer of
authority in respect of education and health services;
initially (except in the case of Mexico, as already
mentioned), both types of goods were treated similarly.
The characteristics of social services are very
different, however, from those of basic infrastructure
services: whereas in the case of the latter demand is
clearly differentiated geographically (especially by
physical factors), in the case of post-Welfare State social
services the demand is differentiated geographically in
its qualitative aspects, but in quantitative terms all
citizens have an equal right for the State to give them
similar access, regardless of their place of residence.
This differentiation, already postulated as early as
1996 (Finot, 1996; eclac/ilpes, 1998), should provide a
clear distinction between two systems of redistribution:
one based on purely territorial transfers, with free
availability of resources but only in proportion to the
corresponding relative local efforts,15 whose aim is to
subsidize local initiatives and efforts to provide
infrastructure services, and the other, based on social
transfers and operated by the local government
authorities, designed to ensure that all the inhabitants
of a country have access to a minimum basket of
“social” goods and services.16
14
 This would make it possible to equalize, for all the communities,
the marginal benefit of the expenditure with its respective cost in
terms of taxes, in a similar manner to the (theoretical) case in which
the whole of local expenditure is financed with local taxes, which
is a condition for efficiency emphasized by Tanzi (1995) and Oates
(1999).
15
 Relative fiscal efforts: basically measured as a function of the
level of income (or poverty) of each local community.
16
 Whose financing should, however, be aided by contributions by
the local areas with higher incomes, as José A. Ocampo points out.
III
Fiscal decentralization in Latin America
Initially, Latin American decentralization processes
could be classified according to whether they take place
in federal or unitary countries. In federal countries,
decentralization was initially focused on the states or
provinces making up such countries. This was also the
case in Brazil in 1941, but since the entry into force
of the 1988 Constitution, the Brazilian process has been
focused not only on the states but also on the
municipalities, and there has even actually been greater
emphasis on the municipal level. The municipalities are
considered to have the same autonomous status as the
federated states, and it is laid down that the relations
between the two levels should only be relations of
coordination (Federal Republic of Brazil, 1988).
In the unitary countries, in contrast, decentralization
focused on the municipal level prevails, although there
are also cases of different extents of decentralization
to the intermediate level: in Bolivia and Chile, for
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example, designated authorities share powers with
representatives elected by the municipal councils,17
while in Colombia both the Governors and the
members of the Departmental Assemblies are directly
elected.
In the following sections, the framework thus
defined will be applied both to the countries studied
and to their systems of basic transfers from the national
level.
1. Tax bases, by levels
Table 2 gives a summary of the tax bases for each level
of government in six Latin American countries,
TABLE 2
Latin America (six countries): Main sources of tax income of each level of
governmenta
Source: Finot (2001), updated.
a N = national or federal; I = intermediate level; M = municipal; 1 = contributes to the system for compensating units of government at a
lower level or levels; 2 = contributes to the system for compensating units of government at the same level.b Envisaged in the 1988 Constitution, but not yet instituted.
c VAT = Value Added Tax.
d GSST = Goods and Services Sales Tax.


























































































































 In both these countries there is now strong pressure for these
representatives to be directly elected, which would be in keeping
with the view that each subnational level should be independent of
the others, as in Brazil.
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indicating also which taxes are shared (i.e., help to
finance basic transfers) and with which level of
government.
In Argentina and Brazil, the main sources of tax
income at the intermediate level are sales taxes; in
Mexico, the main source is personal income tax and
corporate income tax (not levied in some states), while
there are no important sources of such income in
Venezuela. In Bolivia, the main tax income of this level
comes from departmental royalties on hydrocarbons
(11% of the wellhead value); in Chile there is no
important source of such income, while in Colombia
the tax income of the departments comes only from
taxes on property registration and on liquor and
cigarettes.
At the municipal level, the main tax bases are the
authorization of economic activities (licences to
operate), corporate income tax, real estate and, to a
lesser extent, ownership and/or circulation of vehicles
(in Brazil, these latter taxes belong to the states). The
fact that Argentina is practically the only country where
the municipal level has no direct tax income shows that
in that country decentralization is focused primarily on
the provincial level.18
FIGURE 1
Latin America (five countries): Shares in fiscal income, excluding
social security, by levels of government, 1992-2001a
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2001 and 2002).
a For Brazil, the period studied was 1991-1998, and for Mexico, 1991-2000.
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19
 The following tables have been prepared using the database of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this database,
corresponding data are not available for Colombia, in the case of
Argentina the amounts corresponding to municipalities are not
separated from those for the provinces, and the accounts for Brazil
and Argentina were prepared on the basis of classification criteria
which do not coincide with those used for the countries in question.
In the fiscal accounts for Brazil, for example, for legal reasons
“social contributions” include income which would actually be
earmarked taxes according to other criteria. For making comparative
analyses, however, the IMF data are the only ones available which
are calculated on the basis of common criteria.
Figure 1 shows the importance of the contributions
of each level to public income in the countries for which
comparable information is available.19 Table 2 and figure
1 show the preponderance of the national level —and
to a lesser extent of some intermediate levels— in
resource generation, in contrast with the low weight of
the municipal level. It should also be taken into account
that the municipal share corresponds largely to a
minority of municipalities which have the most
valuable economic activities and real estate.
2. The financing of basic transfers
Figure 2 shows the share of the autonomous decisions
of subnational levels of government in total fiscal
expenditure. Obviously, in this case the share of the
subnational levels is higher because it includes
18
 In Chile, urban real estate taxes are not officially municipal either,
but almost the whole of the revenue from those taxes goes to that
level.
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FIGURE 2
Latin America (five countries): Shares in fiscal expenditure, excluding
social security,a by levels of government, 1992-2001b
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2001 and 2002).
a According to Afonso (2004), the distribution of expenditure for the same years, but including social security, would be: municipalities:
16.1%; states: 27.3%, and national level: 56.7%.
b For Brazil, the period studied was 1991-1998, and for Mexico, 1991-2000.





















transfers.20 Noteworthy is the importance of the
intermediate levels in the decentralized federal
countries and, once again, the markedly lesser
importance of the municipal level. This shows the ample
space that still exists for deepening decentralization
in Latin America.
In the following paragraphs, the analysis will
concentrate on basic transfers: that is to say, those
designed to support autonomous subnational decisions.
These transfers typically come from shared taxes.
Table 3 gives an updated summary of the sources of
financing of basic transfer systems in each of the
countries studied.
It can be seen from that table that, whereas in most
cases basic territorial transfers come from national
taxes almost as a whole, in Brazil they come mainly
from only two federal taxes (income tax and the tax
on industrial products), while in Chile they come
exclusively from municipal taxes. The advantage of the
Brazilian system is that, since the transfers come from
only a few taxes, the federal government has ample
leeway to apply its fiscal policy, while the advantage
of the Chilean system is that it involves sharing out
sources of income that are usually very unequally
distributed, whereas its obvious disadvantage lies in the
small amount of resources generated by that source.
3. Distribution criteria
In both Argentina and Brazil, basic transfers are
determined in line with fixed coefficients which were
originally determined on the basis of criteria taking
account of population and, to a lesser extent, poverty.21
In Brazil, however, the Interstate Participation Fund is
focused primarily (85%) on the relatively less
developed states, while the Municipal Participation
Fund is distributed in the light of the number of
inhabitants of each municipality. In Bolivia, population
is the main criterion, whereas in Colombia and Chile
there is a tendency to try to make up for social
inequalities (table 4).
Colombia has recently decided on a major
transformation of its transfer system (Colombia, 2003):
under Act No. 715, all the previous systems (municipal
participation, fiscal subsidies and development funds)
21
 For more details on the transfer systems of Brazil and Argentina,
see respectively Afonso (2004) and Cetrángolo and Jiménez (2004).
20
 Comparing figures 1 and 2 does not give any idea of the vertical
imbalance at each level, because they are not based on absolute
values.
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were unified in a single General Participation System
and a clear differentiation was made between a “multi-
purpose” transfer system (17%) —which would now
consist of basic transfers to be used primarily for the
provision of basic infrastructure services— and two
other systems, the amounts of which are calculated in
the light of needs and costs. The latter two systems are
designed to provide family income subsidies so that all
inhabitants can have the same access to a certain
minimum level of education and health services, thus
representing a social redistribution system to be
operated by the subnational levels of government (83%
of all transfers).22
TABLE 3
Latin America (six countries): Financing of basic
territorial transfersa
22
 On the basis of the Colombian experience, Shah (2002) proposes
the more general use in Latin America of “conditioned” transfers,
in order that all citizens may have equal access to a certain minimum
level of services. In this case, however, these would not be
In Mexico, a clear differentiation was made from
the beginning between freely disposable transfers to the
states (“shares”, of which 20% would be for the
municipalities) and transfers aimed exclusively at
financing specific social programmes, especially
infrastructure and education and health services
(“contributions” to the states and municipalities). The
Mexican Participation System is the only one in the
region in which the subnational fiscal effort
predominates (45.17%), followed in this respect by
Colombia, where 10% of the general-purpose resources
depend on local fiscal efforts. In Chile, using a strictly
redistributive criterion, the amount of transfers is
conditioned territorial transfers but social transfers operated by the
subnational levels of government. This author does not explain how








Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of official information of each country.
a This table does not include basic transfers from the intermediate to the municipal level, which in the case of Brazil amount to 25% of the
Goods and Services Sales Tax, each state being obliged to distribute 75% of this amount as a function of the gross domestic product of
each municipality.
b Other territorial participation systems in Brazil are the Compensation Fund on Exports of Industrial Products (FPEX) —10% of the revenue
































Value Added Tax (VAT)
Profits Tax
Consumption and other taxes
Income Tax
Tax on Industrial Products
Income Tax
Tax on Industrial Products
Income Tax
Tax on Production and Services
External Trade Tax
Tax on Vehicles
All national taxes except Special Tax on
Hydrocarbons
External Debt Relief (transfers from rest of
world)
On total current income
Taxes on real estate, vehicles and licences
to operate businesses
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TABLE 4
Latin America: Distribution criteria for basic territorial transfers
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calculated as an inverse function of per capita
municipal income.
4. Conditioning of expenditure
Table 5 gives a summary of the conditions imposed on
the use of basic transfers in each of the countries
studied. Neither Argentina nor Mexico apply
conditions on the use of these transfers.
In Brazil, the Fiscal Responsibility Act adopted
in the year 2000 (Federal Republic of Brazil, 2000) lays
down that states and municipalities can only spend a
maximum of 50% on personnel costs, or 60% in the
case of the federal government. Furthermore, according
to the 1988 Constitution, at least 25% of the
expenditure of states and municipalities must be
devoted to education.
Brazil has an ongoing policy of seeking to reduce
territorial differences in the levels of provision of social
services. With this aim, since 1988 health services
receive additional compensatory financing through the
Unified Health System, and in 2000, through a
constitutional amendment, it was decided to gradually
increase transfers and the conditions imposed on
expenditure for the benefit of this sector. In addition,
in order to reduce territorial differences in school
education services, the Fund for the Maintenance and
Development of Basic Education and the Upgrading
of Teaching Staff (FUNDEF) was established, mainly
financed through a 15% share in the State Participation
Fund, the Municipal Participation Fund, the Goods and
Services Sales Tax and the Export Promotion Agency
(APEX), for the purpose of ensuring a certain minimum
level of public expenditure per pupil.
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Generally speaking, the unitary countries apply
more conditions to basic transfers in line with the size
of the latter. In Colombia, 51% of the “general
purpose” transfers must be spent in sectors defined by
the central government (41% on drinking water supply
and sanitation). In Bolivia, although there are fewer
conditions on basic transfers, in most of the
municipalities these are used as local contributions for
gaining access to resources from the Regional
Development Fund (loans) and the Investment Fund for
Production and Social Activities (transfers), which are
assigned at the central level.23
Finally, in Chile basic transfers (coming from the
municipal level itself) are freely disposable but, since
they are only small, in most cases they are used almost
entirely for operational expenditure (including that
arising from the operation of the system of social
transfers) and for the provision of some services such
as refuse collection and disposal; for investment, the
municipalities depend on various other sources, the
most important of which is the Regional Development
Fund, where local contributions are usually required
and transfers are decided on a project by project basis
at the intermediate level.24
5. An overview of the transfer systems
Using the analytical framework designed in the first
part of this section (see table 1), figure 3 classifies
the different transfer systems analysed and schematically
outlines their characteristics and evolution. This
figure shows that —except in the Participation System
of Mexico and, to an incipient extent, that of
Colombia—25 the basic transfer systems adopted in
Latin America do not help to encourage expenditure
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of each country’s legislation.
a Limitation on expenditure, not only on the transfers.
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Latin America (seven countries): Conditions on the use
of basic territorial transfers
23
 Although it is not among the countries studied, it is important to
mention the case of Guatemala, where it was recently decided that
resources from the Integral Municipal Development Programme will
be distributed to municipalities and associations of municipalities
“in direct proportion to their respective local contributions with
regard to their respective levels of poverty and their population
density, taking into account both the amount of local taxes collected
and the value assigned to their citizens’ contributions in terms of
labour, kind or money for the provision of public goods” (Guatemala,
2002).
24
 In the case of primary health attention and school education in
Chile and health attention and school education in Bolivia, there is
decentralization —in principle, political decentralization— to the
municipalities of responsibility for the provision of infrastructure,
equipment and supporting personnel, but there is only operational
decentralization of responsibility for specialized personnel (both the
terms of employment and the financing of such personnel are decided
at the national level). The particular feature of Chile is that the
financing of specialized personnel is effected, in the case of
education, through subsidies to municipalized and private schools
according to the number of students who attend classes in them,
and in the case of health services, through demand subsidies assigned
through a system of evaluation of beneficiaries by the municipalities.
Colombia has adopted the main lines of this system, but has applied
it to the total cost of the services in question.
25
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FIGURE 3
Latin America (six countries): Transfer systems Autonomy of expenditure





























to depend on local contributions. Consequently, in the
absence of this automatic control mechanism, there is
a tendency to increase administrative control
mechanisms, which is standard practice in the
programmes financed with assigned transfers. At all
events there is a clear tendency to move out of the
quadrant corresponding to political decentralization of
expenditure, including the cases of Chile and Bolivia
mentioned in the previous paragraph (this situation is
represented in figure 3 by the bold arrows).
Although the Mexican system promotes fiscal
efficiency, it does not appear to give corresponding
results in terms of equity: the fact that transfers are
proportional to increases in revenue collection may act
as a multiplier of disparities, as local governments with
fewer resources would find it more difficult even to
make investments in the improvement of their revenue
collection procedures.26 Furthermore, the Mexican
system is focused on the states, and reaches the
municipalities only through them. Finally, the amounts
of these freely disposable transfers are still markedly
below those of the assigned transfers, so that there is
a good deal of room for improving this system and
even establishing a similar one aimed at the
municipalities while maintaining the basic mechanism
for ensuring efficiency.
The fundamental explanation for this situation
would be that —as already noted on other occasions—
in the political context in which these processes were
initiated, the necessary distinction was not made
between territorial distribution, on the one hand, and
social distribution, designed to guarantee certain levels
of access to the whole population, on the other. The
present tendency all over the region, however, is
precisely to make such a distinction, although this is
more difficult in the case of the federal countries. This
may be seen in the case of Brazil, and more clearly in
that of Chile, but it is in Colombia that the distinction
has been most clearly marked, as already noted.
So far, decentralization processes have been
aimed mainly at the implementation of social policies.
This tendency is evident even in the conditions
imposed on the use of multi-purpose transfers under
the new system introduced in Colombia. What is to be
26
 In the European Union, territorial transfers are also subject to
decisions which take account of the respective local (by the
intermediate and /or municipal levels) and national contributions.
Unlike the Mexican case, however, these transfers are exclusively
for regions and localities whose per capita GDP is below the European
average, and in principle they are proportional to that difference.
At present, 41% of such transfers is for infrastructure and 34% for
production development.
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done, however, when increasing local autonomy is of
decisive importance for enhancing economic
competitiveness and incorporating small and medium-
sized producers into this effort, so that they can
increase their income? And what can be done to give
all localities equal opportunities?
IV
Some guidelines
The transfer systems adopted in most of the countries
of the region involve various combinations of political
decentralization and purely operational decentralization
of decisions taken by the central government. Both
types of decentralization are of value, depending on the
characteristics of the different types of public goods
whose provision is decentralized, but generally
speaking the transfer systems are causing the dividing
line between the two types of decentralization to
depend not so much on the demand characteristics of
the goods in question as on the capacity of each local
district to generate its own resources. This means that
the right of citizens to provid themselves with local
public goods depends on the level of wealth of the
district in which they live: the poorer the district, the
lower its level of autonomy in this respect.
Except in Brazil, the great majority of Latin
Americans have very little autonomy for deciding,
initiating and controlling the execution of local
development strategies, and moreover this autonomy is
tending to grow still smaller. Not only is the share of
municipal expenditure in total public expenditure still
quite small, and generally depends to a large extent on
territorial transfers, but those transfers are tending to
be increasingly subject to conditions on their use. In
each case, local autonomy depends more and more on
the capacity of the local area to generate income of its
own —specifically, to receive tax revenue— and in
Latin America this capacity is extremely unequally
distributed, since the generation of value added is
concentrated in a relatively small number of localities.
All this gives rise to a situation of growing inequality
as regards a citizen’s right to receive local public goods.
The transfer systems prevailing in the region are
inadequate not only in terms of equity but also
efficiency. Even within the limited amounts of
autonomy they allow, they tend to separate decisions
on expenditure from those on the generation of local
income (and this occurs even in Brazil, the only
exception in the region being the Participation System
applied in Mexico). They thus impede the process of
revealing geographically differentiated preferences,
which is essential if decentralization is to contribute to
efficiency.
There is undoubtedly a need for transfer systems
which are not linked with local fiscal efforts, especially
in the case of social services. In Latin America,
however, the main design problem is that, in the
attempt to “devolve” to local levels of government the
functions which they previously exercised, the
financing of services such as education and health —
in which the State must ensure that all persons have a
similar level of access, regardless of their place of
residence— has been treated in the same way as the
financing of basic infrastructure services, the demand
for which is clearly differentiated by physical factors.
In the first case, the autonomy of local governments
should be limited to the definition of qualitative aspects,
and as far as financing is concerned, those governments
should act primarily as agents of a national social
redistribution system. In the second case —basic
infrastructure services— however, it would be extremely
desirable to transfer the whole process of their provision,
including the decisions on their financing, to the
subnational level whose territorial area of authority best
corresponds to the common characteristics of the
demand for each such public good.
A clear distinction should be made, as in
Colombia, between social transfers designed to give all
individuals equal opportunities and territorial transfers
proper, which are designed to give equal opportunities
to subnational communities in terms of the goods
consumed by all, the major part of which, from the
financial point of view, would correspond to basic
infrastructure services.27 In order to reconcile equity
with efficiency, in this second case the transfers should
27
 A given level of drinking water consumption should form part of
the “basket” of social goods. As we proposed elsewhere, subsidies
for such consumption would be added to the income flow that local
communities should receive in order to provide their inhabitants
with drinking water and sanitation (Finot, 1999).
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be freely disposable but proportional to the relative
fiscal efforts of each local community.
These changes in the system of territorial transfers
could be accompanied by changes in local decision-
making processes designed to promote the effective
identification of preferences: that is to say, to promote
effective citizen participation in decisions not only on
“what” and “how much” to provide, but also on how
much of their income they should contribute for that
provision. The systems of decision-making,
representation and participation should be adapted to
this purpose.
The present system for electing citizens’
representatives at the municipal level —proportional
representation— would not appear to be the most
suitable for securing better expression of local citizens’
preferences: the “preferences” represented under this
system could easily correspond to those of the political
leaders who put candidates on their lists rather than to
those of the citizens they are supposed to represent. The
opposite could be expected if a system of territorial
representation were adopted in which representatives
were obliged to collect information from the people
they represent, and inform the respective electoral
districts accordingly, on pain of losing their seats. This
change should be accompanied by the installation of
easily understood systems of basic and management
information and social participation and representation
policies designed to equalize citizens’ capacity to exert
their influence. Furthermore, in order to clearly establish
who is responsible for controlling expenditure, a clear
distinction should be made, both in budgets and in the
accounts, between items corresponding to autonomous
decisions of the local communities and those
corresponding to actions executed by the local
governments as agents of the central government.
In order for the citizens thus represented to be able
to decide what part of their income should be used for
the provision of local public goods, as a function of
the benefits offered by different options for such
provision, it would be essential —as I have been
proposing since 1996— to increase citizens’ powers to
levy taxes on themselves, and specifically, to decide
the rates of local taxes directly affecting their property
and income,28 incorporating in the calculation of the
local contributions for the generation of public goods
the amounts that citizens contribute through their
organizations in the form of labour, kind or money.29
Territorial transfers, then, should be subject to
these local decisions. In the interests of stability,
however, the national authorities should periodically
define the factors by which the subnational fiscal
efforts are multiplied for determining the amount of
such transfers.
Within this institutional framework, one crucial
aspect remains to be settled: to what level should the
provision of each local public good be decentralized?
Obviously, the closer the correspondence between the
area of demand for each local public good and the ambit
of the respective political decisions on resource
assignment, the more efficient the latter decisions will
be. On the one hand, decisions on the provision (and
financing) of local goods should be decentralized to the
levels closest to the citizens (the sub-municipal levels),
while on the other hand territorial association in line with
the different ambits of demand should be promoted
through the new transfer system (Finot, 2003).
In the case of habitat-related public goods, many
decisions could be taken at sub-municipal levels. With
regard to production development, however, the
municipal area is often insufficient. In order to stimulate
local economic development under conditions of
efficiency and equity, then, both in unitary and federal
countries it should promote —through territorial
transfer systems like that proposed above (freely
disposable but proportional to the respective relative
contributions)— the formation of municipal consortia
configured as a function of physical, biological, cultural
and/or economic factors common to the members of
the consortium (but different from other areas of the
country).
This form of territorial organization could be
expected to correspond better to geographical
differences in demand for public goods, such as the
planning of land use, the organization of the supply of
services, and the provision of basic infrastructure
services, and it would have the additional advantage
of generating economies of scale, not only for creating
favourable conditions for local and/or regional
development but also for managing the provision of
social services and subsidies better. In order to facilitate
these functions, such consortia should be of a public
28
 This does not mean decentralizing the tax collection process. In
many cases it is preferable to have a single tax collection system
serving all levels of government. It would also be appropriate, in
order to reduce moral hazard, to externalize the valuation of real
estate used as a basis for calculating property taxes.
29
 As currently provided for in the Regulations of the General
Decentralization Act in Guatemala.
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nature but should only be temporary, so that the
districts represented can keep on adapting to the way
the geographical configuration of demand evolves over
time.30
Through a system of territorial transfers like that
proposed above, the formulation of local/regional
development strategies involving commitments for
local contributions could be promoted through
processes of concerted decision-making and action
between public, social and private actors and the
various levels of the State. These strategies would serve
as the basis for land use definition and a multi-year
budget programme for the provision of infrastructure
services and advanced services. The levels above the
purely local ones would be responsible for
complementing these decisions with the provision of
such services in their own respective ambits and with
30
 Coinciding with our proposal, the Brazilian Congress has just
adopted an Act giving the status of public organizations to all inter-
territorial consortia, for as long as the members of the consortia
deem appropriate.
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